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Making connections and thinking through emotions: between 
geography and psychotherapy 
 
Abstract 
The current upsurge of interest in emotions within geography has the potential to 
contribute to critical perspectives that question conventional limits to scholarship. Three 
precursors of emotional geographies are discussed in this context (humanistic, feminist 
and non-representational geographies). Connections between emotional geographies and 
psychotherapy are explored with a view to resisting the equation of emotion with 
individualised subjective experience, and developing situated, relational perspectives. 
Psychotherapy is approached as a theory of practice that accords central importance to 
affective qualities of relationships, which is shown to be directly relevant to geographical 
engagements with emotion. The distinction between feelings and representations of 
feelings is revisited through a discussion of psychotherapeutic meaning-making. 
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Making connections and thinking through emotions: between 
geography and psychotherapy 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, the term “emotion” has begun to crop up with increasing frequency in the 
work of human geographers. In this article, I reflect on conceptualisations of emotion 
informing this work, and I argue that psychotherapeutic thinking offers valuable 
resources for developing emotional geographies. Sociologist Simon Williams (2001, 1) 
recently observed that emotion has often figured as the “’scandal’ of reason”, so that 
questions of emotion have long been “[b]anished to the margins of Western thought and 
practice”. In this context, the burgeoning of geographical work on emotion can be 
understood as a testament to the flourishing within the discipline of critical perspectives 
willing to question conventional limits to scholarship. But the introduction of emotion into 
the vocabulary of geographical scholarship does not necessarily challenge dominant ideas 
about what constitutes knowledge. Having excluded emotions from knowledge that counts, 
it is perfectly possible that emotions might now be admitted in ways that allow the 
business of geography to proceed “as normal”. This article is motivated in part by my 
concern that emotions and emotional life might be too safely contained within, and too 
severely limited by, conceptual framings that evacuate the radical potential of this new 
work (compare Callard 2003; Thrift 2004).  In elaborating this concern, I argue for an 
approach to emotion that persistently unsettles claims to the position of the rational 
knower, thereby retaining the critical edge promised by emotional geographies. At the 
core of my argument is a plea for emotion to be approached not as an object of study but 
as a relational, connective medium in which research, researchers and research subjects 
are necessarily immersed. 
In order to develop my account, I begin by locating current interest in emotions 
within its wider context, suggesting that it is informed by three existing bodies of 
geographical scholarship, which each offer important insights, but in certain respects also 
risk limiting the ways in which emotional geographies might develop. In order to advance 
existing debates about how emotion might be conceptualised, I then turn to 
psychotherapeutic ideas. Drawing attention to key limitations of existing geographical 
engagements with this body of work, I argue that psychotherapy offers a theory of 
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practice, which provides important insights for geographers interested in developing 
relational approaches to emotional geographies. It is not my intention to claim that this is 
the only way to theorise emotions relationally, but simply that psychotherapy provides one 
set of resources through which this goal can be realised. 
My approach draws on my own hybrid position between geography and the field of 
psychotherapies1. Given the cultural pervasiveness of psychotherapeutic discourses, 
perhaps we are all in some ways inside their grip (Furedi 2003; Nolan 1998; Parker 1997; 
Rose 1990). However, in my own case, insiderness has been actively and self-consciously 
chosen and constructed in the sense that I hold accredited practitioner membership of a 
professional body for counselling and psychotherapy as well as being an academic 
geographer. This dual professional identity means that, in certain respects, I embody a 
conversation across the two respective disciplines. Doreen Massey (2004) has recently 
described the sheer hard work required to enable and sustain effective interdisciplinary 
communication. Even when such conversation is located within one person, the task is, I 
would argue, still difficult and challenging. In so far as this article articulates such a 
conversation, it has, in effect, taken several years to produce. 
 
Geography’s Emotional Turn 
In 2001, an editorial in Transactions by Kay Anderson and Susan Smith called for 
consideration of a variety of emotional geographies as an arena in which to deepen and 
extend geographical research agenda. In 2002, a conference at Lancaster University 
organised by Joyce Davidson entitled “Emotional Geographies” solicited over 80 papers, 
suggesting that researchers in geography and a range of other disciplines had taken heed 
of, and were answering, Anderson and Smith’s call. The 2003 and 2004 annual conferences 
the Association of American Geographers both included several sessions with titles like 
“spatialising emotions”. Many papers from these various conference are now coming 
through to publication (see for example Gender, Place and Culture 11, 3; Social and Cultural 
Geography 5, 4; Davidson et al. 2005) and it appears that a sub-discipline of emotional 
geographies is speedily and energetically coming into being. 
                                                   
1 I use the term “psychotherapies” as an inclusive descriptor of a range of related 
practices that include counselling, psychotherapy, psychoanalysis, analytic psychology, arts 
therapies and many more, informed by humanistic, psychodynamic and cognitive-
behavioural theoretical orientations.  
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In some ways, geography is following rather than leading in this upsurge of interest 
in emotions. For example, some 25 years ago, Arlie Hochschild (1979, 1983) set in motion a 
body of work on the sociology of emotions, while Michelle Rosaldo (1980) and Catherine 
Lutz (1988) did likewise in anthropology. It is easy to point to much older precursors in a 
diverse range of disciplines including philosophy, psychology and biology. Nevertheless, 
emotions do seem to be attracting particular attention right now across the disciplines, 
from neurobiology (Damasio 2000, 2003; Gerhardt 2004; LeDoux 1998), through 
philosophy (Nussbaum 2001), political science (Nolan 1998) and sociology (Barbalet 2002; 
Lupton 1998; Williams 2001), to cultural studies (Berlant 2004, Sedgewick 2003), as well 
as geography. This academic interest in emotions is inseparable from wider social, cultural 
and political trends, in which emotions have moved towards the centre of public life, 
commercial activity and consumption. As Arlie Hochschild (1983) noted over two decades 
ago, service sector workers are increasingly expected to make available and deploy 
“emotional labour”, offering consumers particular kinds of commodified emotional 
experiences. For Nikolas Rose (1985, 1990), the “psy-disciplines” have been central to 
these trends, fostering the production of subjects oriented towards emotional dimensions 
of their experience. The rise of academic interest in emotions is, therefore, part and 
parcel of what some commentators have described – sometimes with considerable hostility 
– a more general the “emotionalisation” of culture, politics and social life (Furedi 2003; 
Berlant 2004). In this context, what we might call an emotional turn within and beyond 
geography may be just as much an uncritical manifestation of these wider processes as a 
critical response to them. Reflection on how emotions are conceptualised and on the 
politics of engaging with questions of emotion is therefore vital to the capacity of 
emotional geographies to advance geographical knowledge in significant ways. 
In a recent article about the spatial politics of affect, Nigel Thrift (2004, 57) takes 
urban studies to task for its relegation of emotion and affect  “off to the side”. Perhaps 
because I have generally felt my own disciplinary position to be closer to margin than 
centre, I view the issues rather differently. I will come back to the distinction between 
affect and emotion in due course, but initially I want to suggest that there are clear 
connections between current concern with emotions (and with feelings and affect), and at 
least three pre-existing and sometimes overlapping geographical traditions, namely 
humanistic geography, feminist geography, and non-representational geography (compare 
Parr 2005). I argue that these traditions have each laid important foundations for the 
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development of emotional geographies but that each is also limited in certain important 
respects. 
 
Humanistic geography: foregrounding subjective realities and evoking emotions 
The criticism that human geography privileges objectivity and rationality at the expense 
of subjective aspects of life was a rallying cry for humanistic geography some three 
decades ago. While the term “emotion” may not have figured prominently in the work of 
humanistic geographers, the call to consider subjective dimensions of human life 
stimulated a substantial body of research that attended to how people feel and 
experience places and spaces (e.g. Buttimer and Seamon 1980; Ley and Samuels 1978; 
Rowles 1978). Inspired by philosophical movements such as phenomenology and 
existentialism, this work countered the objectifying tendencies associated with efforts to 
generate systematic, generalisable knowledge about the “external“ world, and focused 
instead on questions of human meanings, perceptions and values. The concept of the “life-
world”, on which many humanistic geographers drew, offered a way of overcoming 
distinctions between objective and subjective, and between external and internal worlds. 
Humanistic geographers argued for a holistic understanding of human experience, in the 
sense that subjectivity was understood to pervade all that people do, including, for 
example, their economic as well as cultural activities. 
Such ideas were used to advance powerful critiques of the damage wrought in the 
name of (de-humanising forms of) rational progress (e.g. Eyles 1985; Relph 1976; Tuan 
1979). Much of this work was deeply concerned with feelings evoked by places, whether of 
love, hate, pleasure, pride, grief, rage, guilt, remorse and so on, although its conceptual 
focus tended to veer away from problematising or conceptualising the emotions it 
highlighted. Nevertheless, the legacy of this body of humanistic geography has helped to 
inspire current geographical engagements with emotion. 
The flowering of humanistic geography in the 1970s developed in part as a critique 
and alternative to the notion of geography as a spatial science informed by the 
assumptions of neo-classical economics, in which human beings are assumed to behave as 
autonomous, economically rational actors. While behavioural geographers relinquished the 
assumption of economic rationality, humanistic geographers went further, posing important 
philosophical questions about fundamental qualities of human being. In this context, 
implicitly, if not explicitly, emotions were attributed to the inner, subjective worlds of 
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human individuals, often arising as responses to external stimuli, but felt by and belonging 
to human individuals. 
According to its critics, humanistic geography was overly concerned with individual 
experience, and was limited by an understanding of human action that privileged human 
consciousness and human agency, and that assumed people to be self-contained, self-
directing agents capable of self-knowledge, clearly demarcated from other people and 
their environments, even if motivated by non-rational attachments to them (Gregory 1981). 
This view of human beings, with its focus on individual subjectivity, conscious (albeit non-
rational) intention, and agential capacities, could not, it was argued, attend adequately to 
how human action, consciousness and individuality are produced and shaped by non-
conscious, non-individual and non-human processes (Chouinard and Fincher 1983; Kobayashi 
and Mackenzie 1989). Humanistic philosophies offer important insights through which such 
criticisms can be addressed. For example, Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception locates 
intention and consciousness in bodily awareness and sensation rather than in cognition, and 
in so doing offers resources for rethinking the notion of selves discretely bounded from 
their perceptual environments, as recently elaborated in Joyce Davidson’s (2003) 
phenomenological analysis of geographies of agoraphobia. But this potential was not 
realised in the disciplinary debates engendered by humanistic perspectives in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
Despite the rise of an array of approaches that “decentre” the self-possessed 
conscious subject, the attribution of emotions to individualised subjective experience has 
continued to be very influential within and beyond human geography. Indeed, in the 
decades since the heyday of humanistic geography this view of human subjectivity has 
become increasingly pervasive within western culture, fostered especially by the rise of 
the consumer-citizen associated with neo-liberalism (Larner 2000), and psychological 
theories that fuel a self-fulfilling cycle of pre-occupation with subjective experience, 
thereby fostering the pervasiveness of psychotherapeutic discourses noted above 
(Cushman 1995; Rose 1985, 1990, 1999) 
Overall, therefore, the legacy bequeathed by humanistic geography to the emergent 
sub-discipline of emotional geography is simultaneously suggestive and problematic. On the 
one hand humanistic geography’s commitment to attend to the full richness of subjective 
experiences of places and spaces has provided an important source of inspiration for 
geographical engagements with emotion. On the other hand, its failure to unsettle the 
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alignment of emotion with individualised subjective experience meant that it has not 
developed in ways that necessarily problematise the politics of liberal and neo-liberal 
individualism.  
 
Feminist geography: deconstructing rational/emotional and self/other binaries 
The vision of persons as autonomous, bounded, intentional agents has been challenged from 
many directions. In relation to the development of emotional geographies, one of the most 
relevant sources of critique and reworking has been feminist geography. Drawing 
extensively on poststructuralist ideas, key contributions to feminist geography have 
problematised the binary structure of much geographical thinking, and the alignment of 
these binaries (Bondi 1990; Rose 1993; Massey 1994). Thus, in addition to challenging 
assumptions about the binary categories men and women, feminist geographers have drawn 
attention to, and sought to destabilise, associations that link masculinity to rationality, 
mind and objectivity, while femininity is linked to emotionality, body and subjectivity 
(Longhust 2001; McDowell 1999; Women and Geography Study Group 1997). Feminist 
geographers have therefore sought to undo the mapping of emotion onto and into women’s 
bodies, at the same time as questioning the exclusion of emotion from the domains of 
rationality and masculinity. 
Given the power of binary framings that construe femininity as “not rational”, 
whenever feminist academics draw attention to traditionally feminised issues like 
emotions, there is a risk that one’s own authority to articulate persuasive argument is 
undercut (Bondi 2004). Perhaps because of this, although feminist geographers have often 
focused on issues and topics conventionally excluded from, or regarded as marginal to, 
what counts as geographical knowledge, they have not necessarily made extensive use of 
what might be called “emotion” words. One of the main exceptions to this is research on 
geographies of women’s fear. Addressing one of the gaps resulting from a general neglect 
of women’s experiences, Gill Valentine (1989) helped to initiate a series of contributions 
that challenged assumptions about the irrationality of women’s fear, drawing attention to 
fear-inducing environments (Pain 1991), and to the influence of fear in the production of 
embodied, gendered subjects (Davidson 2003; Day 2001; Koskela 1997; Mehta and Bondi 
1999; Panelli et al. 2004). In so doing, feminist geographers have suggested that emotions 
permeate social and physical environments, as well as the subjective experiences of 
individuals. Thus, although emotions such as fear may be experienced as part of interior 
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subjective realities, in the context of feminist critiques of binary thinking, emotions are 
understood to be generated by and expressive of the wider social relations. 
By questioning assumptions about the autonomy and boundedness of human subjects, 
feminist geographers have troubled distinctions between persons and environments as well 
as the boundaries around individuals (Rose 1993). In this context, the role of emotions has 
attracted particular attention in methodological debates. Once the idea of the researcher 
as detached, objective observer is relinquished, questions abound about the kind of 
positions researchers occupy and the consequences for the knowledge produced. The 
reflexive self-monitoring undertaken by researchers reveals a wide range of emotions, 
from the pleasures of conversations rich with mutual recognition and humour, to 
uncomfortable interactions steeped in anxiety, uncertainty and suspicion, emotions that 
flow between and among people and places, including researchers as well as those on whom 
their research focuses (see for example Avis 2002; Davidson 2001; England 1994; Gibson-
Graham 1994; Gilbert 1994; Moss et al, 1993; Parr 1998; Rose 1997). Against this 
background, several recent contributions to discussions of fieldwork within and around 
feminist geography focus specifically and explicitly on emotional geographies of research 
relationships and practices (Bennett 2004; Bondi 2003a, 2005; Burman and Chantler 2004; 
Laurier and Parr 2000; Meth with Malaza 2003; Widdowfield 2000). 
The unboundedness of human subjectivity has also been explored substantively by 
feminist geographers in ways that have contributed to the emergence of emotional 
geographies, often in the context of studies of embodiment (Longhurst 2000, 2001), 
disability and chronic illness (Dyck 1999; Moss 1999) and mental health problems (Parr 
1999; Davidson 2003). Focusing on troubled and often “othered” subjective experiences, 
such research highlights how bodily boundaries are produced, performed, destabilised and 
redrawn in complex and often emotionally-charged ways. This body of work points towards 
conceptualisations of emotion as intrinsically fluid, embodied and relational (Ettlinger 
2004; Bondi et al. 2005). 
Through its deconstructive engagement with key binaries, including mind/body, 
rational/emotional and self/other, feminist geography offers some important resources 
for the development of relational emotional geographies. It has drawn attention to the 
relationality of emotion methodologically and substantively. Committed to the production 
of situated knowledges, feminist geography does not locate emotions in “others” from 
whom researchers remain detached, but instead resists the objectification of emotions, 
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which are portrayed as fluid and unbounded. But at the same time, feminist geographies of 
emotion remain equivocal about the powerful and widespread tendency to equate emotion 
with individualised human subjectivity. While offering alternative theorisations of 
subjectivity, feminist geography also insists on the importance of “giving voice” to 
marginalised subjects, hence the frequent use of verbatim quotations from transcripts of 
in-depth interviews. For example, in an essay on fear and safety, Ruth Panelli, Jo Little and 
Anna Kraack (2004) call into question a series of binaries using interview material to 
portray how individual women feel. This appeal to the authority of women’s experience is 
one of the hallmarks of feminist work within and beyond geography, but the next approach 
I discuss is sceptical about the capacity of any kind of articulable experience to enable 
the development of emotional geographies in ways that locate and theorise emotions more 
broadly than within individualised subjective experience. 
 
Non-representational geography: beyond discourse, beyond cognition 
It is not only feminist geographers who have become increasingly interested in embodied 
emotions. Cultural geography in particular has been subject to reaction against approaches 
that focus on issues of representation and has responded to calls for much more attention 
to be paid to all that eludes discursive forms of representation (Thrift 1996, 1999; Thrift 
and Dewsbury 2000). The plea for enlivened geographies capable of engaging with the 
myriad of transient and unarticulable practices that constitute everyday lives in ways that 
exceed representation, revisits, and brings new theoretical resources to bear on, 
longstanding questions about what it is that people do, as opposed to what they say they 
do (Lorimer 2004). In this context Nigel Thrift (2004) has emphasised the central 
importance of affect.  
While Thrift (2004) often uses the terms emotion and affect more or less 
interchangeably, he tends to associate the former (emotion) with specific, nameable 
states (joy, shame, envy, pride etc.), empirically attributable to or claimed by 
individualised subjects, and the latter (affect) with that which is pre- or extra-discursive, 
non-individualised and mobilised conceptually rather than empirically. In so doing he 
follows nomenclature generally preferred by psychologists, who have tended to associate 
emotion more with cognition (as, for example, in Daniel Goleman’s (1996) account of 
Emotional Intelligence), and affect more with the body (Probyn 2004). Since non-
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representational theory seeks to challenge the privileging of cognition, affect is the more 
popular term. 
Although some of the research inspired by calls to attend to the non-
representational have drawn on talk and conversation as practices (doings) capable of 
illuminating feelings (e.g. Crouch 2001; Latham 2003), this work has generally eschewed 
the performativity of texts, and has privileged the non-verbal, within which the 
ineffability of feeling can perhaps more readily be emphasised (Harrison 2002). Following 
Nigel Thrift’s (1997) appeal to dance as a body-practice capable of illuminating the non-
representational, Derek McCormack (2003, 492) has used the example of Dance Movement 
Therapy to explore “how people [work] upon geographies of emotion and mood through 
movement”, while Mark Paterson (2005) chooses the example of therapeutic use of touch 
in Reiki massage for similar reasons.  
As Catherine Nash (2000, 656) has argued, such appeals risk reinforcing rather 
than deconstructing a binary opposition between the sensual and the intellectual, thereby 
downplaying the thoughtfulness of non-verbal practices. Partially countering this, Nigel 
Thrift (2004, 60) has insisted that “affect is a different kind of intelligence about the 
world”. And yet he also emphasises the “otherness” of this affective intelligence, 
describing affect as non-reflective and indirect. More generally non-representational 
geography has been characterised by a wariness of forms of meaning-making that might 
somehow sequester those elusive qualities of quick and lively geographies that always 
exceed representability. Herein lies the paradox of non-representational geography: how 
can our own texts ever honour that which lies beyond the scope of discourse? 
Non-representational geographies of affect do not seek to resolve this paradox but 
to work with it. For example, contributors proclaim the performative qualities of their own 
interventions, and draw back from advancing interpretative claims about the practices 
with which they engage (Dewsbury, 2000; Harrison 2002; McCormack 2003). In so doing 
they converge and sometimes overlap with feminist geographers’ insistence on the 
embodied situatedness of knowledge claims (Moss 2005), but there are also tensions 
between the two approaches to emotional geographies. For example, Deborah Thien 
(forthcoming) argues that this work reinscribes a binary distinction between the personal 
and the political, deconstruction of which is central to feminist perspectives, and that it 
thereby repeats a familiar process of holding all that is emotional at a distance. In so 
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doing, non-representational geography avoids the kind of immersion within the medium of 
emotion through which situated emotional geographies might be produced. 
At the risk of over-generalising and over-simplifying, I would suggest that feminist 
geographers find research informed by non-representational theory too abstract, too 
little touched by how people make sense of their lives, and therefore too “inhuman”, 
ungrounded, distancing, detached and, ironically, disembodied. Conversely, those informed 
by non-representational theory find feminist work too reliant on cognitive ways of knowing 
(including especially individual accounts of experience), and insufficiently “transhuman”.  
 
Advancing relational emotional geographies 
As I have outlined, the emergent body of emotional geographies draws on a range of 
precursors. Humanistic, feminist and non-representational geographies share an 
understanding of emotions as ubiquitous and pervasive. In this context each tradition 
offers important inspiration for the development of relational approaches to emotional 
geographies, but each is also problematic. While humanistic geography opened up space for 
engaging with subjective realities, it has not adequately called into question a view of 
emotion as located within individualised experience. Feminist geography has shown how 
emotions connect and flow between people, including researchers and research 
participants, but it too is reluctant to challenge the authority of individual accounts of 
experience. Non-representational geography has no such qualms but risks instead becoming 
too detached from ordinary, everyday modes of articulating emotion, and resists 
relinquishing the position of the rational knower surveying its subject(s) from a distance.  
This review of traditions informing the development of emotional geographies 
highlights two important challenges. First, how can emotional geographies connect and 
engage with everyday emotional life without equating emotion with individualised 
subjective experience? This question is crucial in relation to the politics of emotional 
geographies: failure to trouble individualistic understandings of emotion suggests an 
uncritical relation to wider social trends, while detachment from everyday emotional life 
suggests an unwillingness to situate knowledge claims and unsettle the position of the 
rational knower. Secondly, how can emotional geographies connect and engage with 
expressions of emotion? In particular, how should the status of personal, articulated, 
accounts of emotion to be understood? Do they, as non-representational approaches 
suggest, deflect attention from the vitality of non-cognitive, non-reflective affects, or 
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are they, as feminist geographers suggest, resources for accessing emotional geographies? 
In the remainder of this paper, I argue that psychotherapy, and especially 
psychotherapy’s theory of practice, offers important insights through which these 
questions can be addressed, and the oppositions implicit within them dissolved. In so doing 
I suggest that psychotherapeutic ideas can be mobilised in ways that emotional 
geographies to resist recuperation within objectifying approaches to knowledge 
production.  
 
Psychotherapy’s theory of practice and its relevance to emotional 
geographies 
As noted above, one of the factors associated with the emotionalisation of culture, and 
with the intensification of individualistic consumerism, is the growth of psychotherapeutic 
practices, and their insinuation into more and more aspects of human life (Cushman 1995; 
Furedi 2003; Nolan 1998; Rose 1985, 1990). This might, therefore, seem to be an 
unpromising and problematic direction in which to look for guidance in the development of 
relational approaches to emotional geographies. Certainly, while non-representational 
geographies have drawn upon therapies of movement and touch, they have generally 
emphasised their distance from psychotherapeutic approaches (McCormack 2003). 
However, such hasty dismissal risks overlooking the wealth of ideas inspired by self-
reflexive practices that respond to expressions of emotional distress and unease. We 
might argue about the politics of psychotherapeutic encounters but psychotherapists have 
already been doing that for years (Rieff 1966; Kovel 1988, Lasch 1980). Entering into 
interdisciplinary conversations with psychotherapeutic practices does not foreclose 
criticism. 
Geographers have, of course, drawn a good deal on psychoanalytic theory, especially 
during the past decade or so (Bondi 1997; Callard 2003; Kingsbury 2003; Parr and Philo 
2003; Pile 1996; Rose 1995, 1996; Sibley 1995, 2002). However, these engagements have 
done little to enable conversations with ideas emanating from and inspired by 
psychotherapeutic practice. Indeed, I argue that for two reasons they have unwittingly 
tended to deflect attention away from psychotherapy as a theory of practice.  
First, there has been a tendency to equate psychotherapy with psychoanalysis 
(Oliver 2003). While psychoanalysis has been enormously influential across the whole field 
of psychotherapy, it is not the only body of ideas informing psychotherapeutic theory and 
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practice. For example, the development of both humanistic and scientific (or cognitive) 
psychotherapies during the twentieth century has diversified the field substantially, and 
this diversification has impacted upon psychoanalysis (see for example Kahn 1991). 
Differences between, and debates among, approaches to psychotherapy are complex and 
difficult to summarise. However, among the most obvious differences are those associated 
with conceptualisations of the person: while psychoanalytic approaches theorise persons as 
conflictual, decentred and “other” to/than themselves, humanistic approaches typically 
deploy organic and ecological metaphors to theorise persons as always already whole and 
integrated, albeit sometimes distorted – other than their “true” selves – as a result of 
inhabiting damaging environments, and scientific approaches embrace Descartes’ 
insistence on the power of the mind to theorise persons as governed by perception and 
cognition, which may be “faulty” but which can usually be “corrected” at least partially by 
cognitive methods. Despite the enormity of these differences, psychotherapists continue 
to recognise affinities and similarities between their modes of practice. Moreover, 
research comparing the outcomes associated with different approaches finds very little 
difference in effectiveness between practitioners informed by different theoretical 
orientations (Wampold et al. 1997). In addition, research with recipients about what they 
found helpful or unhelpful therapeutically indicates clearly and consistently that what they 
most value are generic (or “non-specific”) qualities that focus on qualities of their 
experience of the therapeutic relationship rather than anything attributable to the 
specific theory on which practitioners draw (Howe 1993; Mearns and Dryden 1990). In this 
context, psychotherapeutic ideas can usefully be understood as offering a theory of 
practice, articulated in a variety of registers but capable of translation across diverse 
understandings of fundamental qualities of the persons involved in psychotherapeutic 
encounters. 
Secondly, geographers’ engagements with the psychotherapy have been further 
limited by a tendency to treat as unmarked or unqualified rather particular versions of 
psychoanalytic theory, especially those that draw primarily on Freud’s earlier work, often 
refracted through Lacanian theory. One of the hallmarks of this work is its appeal to 
unconscious drives – especially libidinal drives - arising within the human organism, at odds 
with social norms and expectations, and therefore repressed in order to enable and 
sustain entry into the domain of human sociality. While a number of geographers have 
made use of other psychoanalytic traditions, these tend to be marked or qualified by their 
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particularity, as in references to object relations theory (e.g. Sibley 1995, 2001). 
Psychoanalysis and psychotherapy have complex historical geographies. In many contexts, 
including the UK and North America, psychotherapeutic practice is more strongly and 
immediately influenced by bodies of psychoanalytic thought traceable to Freud’s later 
clinical papers and the ensuing post-Freudian debates, than to Freud’s earlier work or 
Lacan’s reading of it. What is distinctive about such work is its emphasis on the impulse to 
relate to others, leading to shift in focus away from unconscious biologically-derived 
drives, towards concern with intra-psychic and interpersonal relationships. The effect of 
the bias within geography has been to further distance geographical engagements with 
psychoanalysis from psychotherapy as it has developed in Anglophone contexts, and to 
underplay, if not completely overlook, the extent to which psychotherapy is constituted by 
its theory of practice, as well as the centrality accorded to relationships in much 
psychoanalytic theory. 
While psychotherapy’s theory of practice is by no means unified, it has become the 
terrain on which common ground has been built to enable psychotherapists to converse 
across differences in their underlying assumptions about the nature and development of 
human beings. In this context, I want to draw on two psychotherapeutic ideas, with a view 
to enriching geographers’ engagements with questions of emotion. The first, which I 
discuss at greater length, concerns the relationality of emotion. The second returns to the 
distinction between affect and emotion, and between feelings and representations of 
feelings, which I argue are productively disrupted in psychotherapeutic understandings of 
practice. 
 
Relationality, emotion and practice 
Perhaps the most important and unifying presupposition of psychotherapy is its emphasis 
on relationships, especially on emotional or affective dimensions of relationships. The 
common assumption that psychotherapy is an individualistic project ignores the way in 
which psychotherapy is an intrinsically interpersonal, relational enterprise (Bondi 2003b). 
In this section I sketch out how psychotherapeutic understandings of the role of the 
therapeutic relationship have evolved and then draw out key implications for emotional 
geographies. 
In the development of Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, his formulation of the concept 
of the transference placed the relationship between analyst and analysand at the centre 
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of psychoanalysis. The idea of transference has acquired a tremendous amount of baggage, 
controversy and mystique. Notwithstanding extensive and important debates, at its core is 
a simple proposition, namely that we all carry the affective impress of our earliest 
patterns of relating into all of our subsequent relationships. In other words how we feel 
towards others in the present is influenced by – and to some extent transferred from - 
our past relationships. Consequently, psychoanalysts, psychotherapists, counsellors, 
doctors, colleagues, students, teachers, friends, children all necessarily receive from us 
ways of being, feeling and interacting that bear the traces of our personal histories.  
Sometimes this idea is caricatured as meaning that everything we do as adults is 
somehow caused by what happened to us as infants and traceable to what early care-givers 
did. This neglects another of Freud’s ideas, enriched by subsequent psychoanalysts, about 
the creativity of our psyches. With this in mind, the transference can be understood as 
expressing what Christopher Bollas (1989) calls our personal idiom, by which he means the 
creative way in which we each give unique form and character to our being, that being 
necessarily bearing the impress of our relationship to others, notably our primary care-
givers on whom we were dependent when we were at our least formed and most malleable. 
The idea of transference began as Freud’s way of making sense of how the patients 
he saw related to him, and he soon came to understand it as the key to psychoanalytic 
treatment (Freud and Breuer 1893-1895/1955). For Freud the transference made the 
patient’s issues directly available for psychoanalytic treatment, which he described as a 
process of repeating (unconsciously re-enacting within the analytic setting) and working 
through (making the underlying experiences available to thought and relinquishing 
symptoms by abandoning the unconscious re-enactment) (Freud 1914/1958). 
One of the reasons why Freud’s emphasis on the transference has been so 
controversial is because it is as much a key to the pernicious abuse of vulnerable patients 
as a key to valuable treatment. If the psychoanalyst has unique access to knowledge of the 
patient’s problems, this invests him or her with an enormously powerful form of authority. 
As feminists have long noted, most famously in the case of his patient Dora, Freud 
sometimes used his ideas to reinforce patriarchal domination (Freud 1905/1953; 
Bernheimer and Kahane 1985). He was not necessarily successful (as in the case of Dora), 
but when he was, psychoanalytic treatment could be understood as a method of extending 
the means of oppression into people’s minds. Thus, critics have argued that psychoanalysis 
generates profoundly abusive relationships (Masson 1984, 1989; Penfold 1998).  
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These criticisms of psychoanalysis have prompted a range of responses from 
outright rejection to reform from within. In what follows I briefly explore two strands of 
response from within the domain of psychotherapies, one psychoanalytic and one non-
psychoanalytic, both of which retain but reformulate the core idea about the centrality of 
the relationship. 
As his conceptualisation of transference developed, Freud acknowledged that 
transferential processes might also mark the responses of psychoanalysts (himself 
included) to their patients, which he called the countertransference. For Freud, the 
countertransference was a problem that could impede treatment and should be minimised 
by the psychoanalyst’s own training analysis (Freud 1912/1958). During this, the would-be 
psychoanalyst would repeat and work though his or her own issues. This, Freud believed, 
would enable psychoanalysts to clear their psyches of anything that might interfere with 
their capacity to receive, in uncontaminated form, the patient’s transference (Freud 
1912/1958). On this view the trained psychoanalyst or psychotherapist should be able to 
differentiate between feelings that are, colloquially, “their own stuff” (the 
countertransference), and feelings that arise as a result of unconscious emotional 
communication from the other person (the transference).  
Ensuing psychoanalytic debates about countertransference, unfolding especially 
from a paper by Paula Heimann published in 1950, challenged Freud’s notion of a clear 
distinction between responses of psychoanalysts attributable to their own issues and 
attributable to their patients’ transferences (Heimann 1950). Instead, practitioners 
informed by psychoanalytic theory, whether psychoanalysts, counsellors or anything else, 
have come to understand their emotional experiences in relation to those with whom they 
work in terms of transference-countertransference relationships that constitute a field 
brought alive between them and through which they both work. Understandings of the 
countertransference have shifted from viewing it as an obstacle, to understanding it as a 
crucial resource or ally (Hughes 2004). This has transformed the task of the practitioner 
away from providing something approximating as closely as possible to a “fully analysed 
mind” that serves as a “blank screen” onto which the patient’s transference is projected, 
towards participating in a relationship saturated with emotion in order to make repetition 
available for reflection, and to facilitate processes of working through. Crucially, the 
feelings that practitioners experience in relation to those with whom they work are 
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understood as intrinsically transpersonal, that is, not as belonging to one person or another 
but as always inspired relationally and contextually. 
This approach to the countertransference means that practitioners are no longer 
understood as authorised by virtue of having worked through all their own issues. Indeed, 
confronted also with the numerous challenges to traditional forms of professional 
authority that flowered in the mid-twentieth century, psychoanalysts began to emphasise 
how little, rather than how much, they knew, and more specifically that the psychoanalyst 
does not know more than the person with whom he/she is working. As D.W. Winnicott 
(1969/1971, 86-87) put it, “I think I interpret mainly to let the patient know the limits of 
my understanding. The principle is that it is the patient and only the patient who has the 
answer”. Thus, psychoanalytic accounts of the therapeutic relationship elaborate a view of 
emotions as intrinsically relational as well as being intensely felt by the persons who 
together constitute the psychoanalytic dyad. As I will illustrate further in due course, this 
approach is of great relevance to geographical efforts to avoid the twin pitfalls of 
equating emotions with individualised subjectivity and conceptualising affect in ways that 
distance it from ordinary human experience (compare Pile 1991). 
There are convergences between this reconceptualisation of the role of the 
psychoanalyst within the analytic relationship and reformulations advanced by humanistic 
psychotherapists. Among the latter, one of the earliest critics of the authority relations 
of psychoanalysis was the American psychologist Carl Rogers and it is his reformulation of 
the therapeutic relationship on which I focus here (Rogers 1951, 1961). Rogers’ ideas 
generated what is now known as the person-centred approach, and contributed to the 
burgeoning of a wide range of non-psychoanalytic, humanistic approaches to 
psychotherapies in the middle of the twentieth century. Rogers came to view 
psychoanalytic theory as a completely unnecessary encumbrance that was far more likely 
to impede than to enable therapeutic work. He had no truck with the idea of the 
unconscious, drives, the transference or the countertransference, and was guided instead 
by a view of human subjectivity as always already containing the potential for benign and 
positive development. In this context he developed a theory of what he called the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of therapeutic personality change, which focus 
entirely on qualities of therapeutic relationships (Rogers 1957). Although he originally set 
out six conditions, these are often reduced to three so-called “core conditions”, empathy 
(the capacity of the psychotherapist to understand the other person’s emotional 
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experience), unconditional positive regard (an attitude of non-judgementalism on the part 
of the psychotherapist) and congruence (the capacity of the psychotherapist to be truly 
him- or her-self, and therefore to be emotionally genuine and honest in the relationship 
with the other person) (for an influential interpretation see Mearns and Thorne 1988).  
For Rogers, psychotherapists do not diagnose and treat by drawing on a body of 
quasi-medical or psychological theory. Instead they listen and seek to convey their 
understanding of the other person’s emotional experience; they cultivate a form of 
acceptance sustainable in the context of deeply disturbed and disturbing behaviour, 
informed by a belief in the human potential for repair and positive self-development; and 
they meet with those with whom they work as emotionally open, honest and genuine people. 
Rogers insisted that “the individual has within himself or herself vast resources for self-
understanding … and that these resources can be tapped if only a definable climate of 
facilitative psychological attitudes can be provided” (Rogers 1986, 135). 
Although their underlying theories of subjectivity are very different, there are 
some important affinities between Rogers’ emphasis on qualities of relating and the post-
Freudian emphasis on the countertransference within psychoanalysis (Kahn 1991). Both 
traditions emphasise the centrality of a relationship in which the person who is seeking 
help is constructed as the one who “has the answers”. Both describe the practitioner as a 
facilitator who provides an environment conducive to the discovery, realisation, 
negotiation, exploration or creation of those answers. The interpersonal flow of emotions 
helps to constitute this environment and it is the psychotherapist’s responsibility to 
maintain key features of that environment, including its temporal and spatial boundaries 
and the capacity to reflect on characteristics of that environment.  
These psychotherapeutic understandings of the dynamics of interpersonal 
relationships have been taken up by a few human geographers in relation to the 
construction and interpretation of fieldwork evidence (Bingley 2003; Bondi 2003; Pile 
1991). My purpose, however, in summarising this key aspect of psychotherapy’s theory of 
practice is to inform theorisations of emotion as intrinsically relational. To do so I offer a 
brief account of the mobilisation of emotion in psychotherapeutic (clinical) supervision 
(compare Bingley 2002), the implications of which I illuminate with reference to a recent 
contribution to the field of emotional geographies. 
One of the key purposes of clinical supervision is to support practitioners to attend 
to how they feel (Holloway 1995; Page and Wosket 1994). Let me speak of this in the first 
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person. As clinical supervisee, I am asked how I feel and how I have felt in relation to 
someone with whom I am working. I am encouraged to acknowledge any kind of feeling or 
sensation, fleeting or persistent. This is not about providing a narrative or interpretative 
account, but about engaging with traces or associations however fragmentary, including 
bodily sensations, thoughts and fantasies as much as reports of emotions. These feelings 
are not understood as uniquely mine but as providing some kind of insight or perspective on 
the betweenness that is constitutive of relationships. This betweenness is understood as 
processual, as part of the movement or flow of emotions between and among people, 
including those present in supervision as well as in the clinical work in question. It is 
directly relevant to all kinds of (non-clinical) encounters and therefore to emotional 
geographies. Theoretically this perspective helps to illustrate and elaborate a 
conceptualisation of emotion that is both transpersonal and grounded in ordinary human 
experience. Methodologically it reminds us that we are necessarily embedded within the 
field of emotional geographies, our access to it simultaneously personalised and 
transpersonal. Put another way, psychotherapy’s theory of practice suggests that a key 
means by which emotional geographies can be explored relationally is via what we 
experience as our own emotional life.  
To illustrate what this might mean for geographical research, I take an example 
from the literature on emotional geographies. In a recent essay Katy Bennett (2004, 415) 
has urged geographers to “make more of emotion in research, moving discussion in 
geography beyond a focus on researchers’ emotions […] to bring the researched (and their 
emotional intelligence) sharply into focus too.” While I agree with her overarching 
argument about the importance of attending to emotion, I would argue that it can only be 
achieved by moving beyond the idea that emotions are attributable either to researchers 
or to those she describes as “the researched”. If we understand emotions as relational, 
they arise and flow between people, producing as much as manifesting what may be felt to 
belong to one person or another.  Indeed, perhaps unwittingly, Katy Bennett illustrates 
this process in her own account.  Although she acknowledges that “emotions […] mediate 
fieldwork” (Bennett 2004, 415), she strives to keep the substantive focus firmly on the 
emotional experiences of her interviewees, and not to draw attention back to herself as 
interviewer, thereby insisting that emotions be attributed to one or the other, and, by 
implication, on the capacity to maintain distance emotional distance between them. And yet 
the integral part she played in the flow of emotions within the interview encounters is 
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evident in a variety of ways, from her interpretation of visual clues, through explaining 
non-verbal qualities of her utterances in an excerpt from a transcript, to the comment 
that sometimes she found she understood her interviewees’ feelings quickly and sometimes 
she did not. These are ways in which she illustrates – implicitly rather than explicitly – the 
intrinsic relationality and betweenness of emotion. She cannot analyse the emotions 
attributed to her interviewees without these comments about herself.  
In Katy Bennett’s account, it turns out that emotional experience can only be 
understood and analysed via the relationship between herself and her interviewees. The 
relevance of psychotherapeutic understandings of the relational dynamics of emotion is 
well-illustrated in her observation about the varying ease with which she could make sense 
of what her interviewees felt. This observation suggests that she seeks to understand the 
other person’s emotional experience through a process of entering into and engaging with 
his or her emotional environment, much as described in the psychotherapeutic literature I 
have discussed. Sometimes this process of entering in leads swiftly to emotional 
communication that creates a sense of understanding what the other person feels. 
Sometimes Bennett’s participation in the flow of emotion generates a sense that what the 
other person feels is not readily communicable. Psychotherapeutic ideas suggest that the 
researcher senses the presence of feelings of some kind but cannot grasp the content of 
those feelings. As the relationship develops, the shape, form and content of emotion 
begins to come into view. Emotions are not necessarily easily recognised, named or 
understood by anyone involved in an encounter, therapeutic or otherwise. Nevertheless 
those involved experience one another and their environments in ways on which they may 
subsequently reflect, in a manner akin to clinical supervision, which, as I have described, 
supports practitioners to conceptualise such experiences relationally. This is relevant not 
only to fieldwork practices but also to how emotions are conceptualised and analysed: it 
illustrates, and highlights the relevance of psychotherapeutic approaches to the fluidity, 
betweenness and subjective relationality of emotions. 
In this section I have elaborated the relevance of a core feature of psychotherapy’s 
theory of practice – the centrality accorded to the therapeutic relationship – to emotional 
geographies. I have argued that different approaches to psychotherapy share a common 
understanding of the betweenness of emotion, and I have shown how this perspective is 
applicable to geographical engagements with emotion, helping to make sense of emotional 
dimensions of fieldwork encounters and informing conceptualisations of emotion. This 
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perspective provides a way of negotiating between personal, subjective, emotional 
experience and a relational theory of emotion. As the development of psychotherapeutic 
thinking about authority and emotion within therapeutic relationship indicates, it is also an 
approach that elaborates a situated account of meaning-making and knowledge production. 
 
Feeling symbolisation: representation and emotion revisited 
One of the key challenges for, and debates within, emotional geographies concerns the 
relationship between feelings themselves and representations or accounts of feelings. As I 
have noted, feminist geographers have generally accorded considerable value to accounts 
of marginalised experiences, including many emotional experiences, while advocates of non-
representational approaches have sought to shift the focus of attention away from 
representations of feeling to feelingness itself. What I argue in this section is that the 
field of psychotherapy has the capacity to enrich geographers’ engagement with 
representation and its limits in relation to emotions by reframing this distinction.  
Psychotherapies are practices that invite people to communicate emotionally. 
Certain psychotherapies (notably psychoanalysis, psychotherapy and counselling) are 
sometimes described as “talking therapies” while “arts therapies” use music, visual 
creativity, enactment and movement to communicate. But alongside the use of different 
communicative media, vital similarities remain, most notably in the emphasis on the 
affective qualities of the therapeutic relationship. Thus, in the so-called “talking 
therapies”, with which I am most familiar, silence, pacing, non-verbal utterances, voice 
timbre, and above all the felt sense that is communicated are at least as (and often more) 
important than words. Put another way, closer to the register of emotional geographies, 
therapeutic encounters conceptualise communication – including silence – as performative 
(compare Thien 2005). But its performativity is understood in complex ways that 
incorporate rather than bracket off representational, narrative or substantive meanings. 
As I have already noted, Freud (1914/1958) described analytic treatment in terms 
of “repeating” and “working through”. The transference-countertransference relationship 
constitutes repetition within a context designed to facilitate possibilities that offer more 
than endless repetition. Thus far, I have focused rather more on “repeating” than on 
“working through”. For Freud “working through” meant making the power of unconscious 
patterns available to thought.  According to a popular misrepresentation of psychotherapy 
this has been taken to mean that the practitioner explains to the person with whom they 
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are working the “real” meaning “behind” their words, thoughts, dreams and actions. 
However, for Freud, “working through” was never and could never be a didactic process 
but must be held within the (transferential) therapeutic relationship. He argued that the 
task of analyst is to hold the frame of the analytic encounter until the analysand is ready, 
willing and able to think about what has been instinctive, habitual and “known” in an 
embodied sense but unthought. He emphasised that this process cannot be hastened and 
requires great patience (Freud 1914/1958). This is a theme psychoanalytic and humanistic 
psychotherapists continue to emphasise, the scope for and timing of new insights or shifts 
in self-perception always being determined within the context of a therapeutic 
relationship, which, as I have already noted, constructs the “recipient” as the person who 
has “all the answers”. 
For Freud, making unconscious patterns available to thought entailed bringing them 
into language, but post-Freudian psychoanalysts in the object relations tradition, together 
with psychotherapists drawing on humanistic ideas, have argued that language is not 
essential to thought (see for example Bollas 1987; Sinason 1992). On this more inclusive 
conceptualisation of thinking, what matters is the capacity to symbolise. “Working 
through” is what happens when affective patterns in one’s personal idiom can be 
symbolised, or symbolised anew, as well as felt. Symbolisation does not replace feelings 
but makes them available to thought (Wright 1991).  
Psychotherapies enact an assumption that the capacity to bring unconscious 
processes or barely articulable and deeply troubling feelings into a symbolic register, or 
into a new kind of symbolic register, may be facilitated through a particular kind of 
relationship dedicated to this task.  In other words, symbolisation is not accomplished by 
agents acting individually but is intrinsically relational. Drawing on both psychoanalysis and 
neuropsychology, Peter Hobson (2004, 24-25) describes the process thus: 
“[an] individual’s ability to think about, rather than avoid [and continuously 
repeat] emotionally important issues is affected by that stance of someone 
else … One of the ways in which psychoanalysis works is by enabling someone 
to understand himself better through expressing things in words … The ability 
to think and to speak in words (a form of symbol) and the ability to 
communicate with someone else who registers what you convey, may keep your 
heart from breaking … [or] keep your mind from disintegrating.” 
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Hobson draws upon an understanding of the core task of psychoanalysis (and other forms 
of psychotherapy) as meaning-making, which he describes as occurring between people, 
that is relationally. He argues that the capacity to generate new meanings relationally may 
make feelings bearable (“keep you heart from breaking”) and/or may sustain the capacity 
for thought (“keep your mind from disintegrating”). His account thus suggests that feeling 
and thinking are two sides of the same coin. At the heart of psychotherapy lies the idea of 
holding open a space for processes of symbolisation into which people come to make new 
“sense” of themselves, their lives and their interpersonal relationships. This “sense” is 
simultaneously felt and thought, embodied and abstract, affective and emotional, 
performative and representational, personally experienced and relational In this way, 
psychotherapy offers a framing that traverses distinctions between representations of 
emotion and the emotions themselves, and between emotion and affect. 
 
Conclusion 
Emotions are an integral part of human life, which geographers cannot afford to ignore. 
The upsurge of interest in affective and emotional geographies is therefore most welcome. 
There are, however, risks that geographical work in this field merely reflects wider 
cultural trends that treat emotions as individualised attributes available for commercial 
and political exploitation. With a view to resisting such tendencies, and to foster the 
radical potential of taking emotions seriously, I have explored key ideas informing the 
emergence of geographical work on emotion. Through its holistic approach to subjectivity, 
humanistic geography provided an important impetus towards engaging with emotional 
dimensions of people’s experiences of place and space. However, the potential for 
theorising subjectivity in ways that blur and rework distinctions between self and other, 
and between self and environment, remained under-developed, as a result of which 
humanistic geography did not challenge the idea that emotion is located within, and 
belonging to, the interior lives of human individuals. In different ways feminist and non-
representational geographies have paved the way for more insistently relational 
approaches to emotion. Feminist geography has emphasised the fluidity and pervasiveness 
of emotion in the context of situated approaches to knowledge-production, in which 
researchers are understood as intrinsically connected to their research subjects. At the 
same time, feminist geography has insisted on the importance of first person accounts of 
experience, which are often understood as locating emotion within individualised 
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subjectivities. Non-representational geography has argued for direct, unmediated 
engagement with the performativity of everyday practice. However, in its insistence on 
going beyond the discursive, the cognitive and individualised experience, non-
representational geography tends to hold everyday, personalised, emotional experience at 
a distance. Key challenges emerging from these traditions, therefore, concern the need to 
conceptualise emotion as relational but not impersonal, and the debate about the 
relationship between feelings and accounts of feelings. 
In relation to these specific challenges, I have argued that psychotherapy’s theory 
of practice offers valuable resources for the development of emotional geographies. I 
have drawn attention to how psychotherapies conceptualise emotion relationally as well as 
personally, suggesting that this approach offers geographers new ways of understanding 
what it means to engage in emotional geographies theoretically and methodologically. I 
have also drawn on psychotherapeutic ideas to explore distinctions between feelings and 
representations of feeling, and between affect and emotion, suggesting that these are 
unhelpful dualisms that detract from geographers’ capacity to engage with the ubiquitous 
and pervasive presence of emotion. 
 In arguing for the relevance of psychotherapeutic thinking to geography, I am not 
advocating that geographers train as psychotherapists or seeking to blur the distinction 
between geographical research and psychotherapeutic practice. As I have argued 
elsewhere (Bondi 2003), geography and psychotherapy are both knowledge-producing 
activities, albeit differently oriented. As a clinical practice, psychotherapy focuses on the 
generation of new meanings within subjective experience. As academic practices, 
geography and psychotherapy seek to produce knowledge capable of informing others 
within and beyond their respective disciplines. In the case of psychotherapy, the writings 
it generates draw on, and are often oriented to, clinical practice. However, these writings 
are equally available for those willing to enter into interdisciplinary conversations, as I 
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